The conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States, which erupted between late February and early March 2026, represents one of the most critical moments the Middle East has experienced in recent years. It is not merely another escalation between regional powers and external actors, but a crisis that could reshape the strategic balance of the entire region. The clashes are no longer limited to the confrontation between Israel, the United States, and Iran alone; they are progressively expanding into other theatres, while the main energy routes crossing the region are already beginning to feel the effects of growing instability.
The objectives of the Washington–Tel Aviv axis
To understand the scale of the confrontation, it is necessary to begin with the objectives that may have guided the Israeli-American initiative. In recent months, several factors had contributed to the perception that Iran’s political system had entered a phase of growing vulnerability. The popular protests that had swept across the country, the military setbacks suffered between 2024 and 2025, and the persistent economic difficulties all suggested a domestic landscape that appeared more fragile than in the past. It is therefore not difficult to hypothesize that Israel and the United States sought to transform external military pressure into a catalyst for internal destabilization.
The underlying assumption appears to have been that an already weakened Iran could collapse under a targeted strike against the upper echelons of power. Eliminating the “head of the snake” by striking key figures such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other military decision-making centres could have triggered either the collapse of the system or forced Tehran to enter negotiations while accepting conditions that had previously been unthinkable.
From this perspective, the objectives of the operation appeared relatively clear: to overthrow (or at least severely weaken) Iran’s revolutionary regime, halt or delay its nuclear programme, reduce Tehran’s regional projection of power, and neutralize its missile capabilities—the cornerstone of Iran’s deterrence strategy and the instrument through which the country compensates for its technological inferiority compared with its rivals. More broadly, the aim was to attempt a restructuring of the regional balance by weakening the power system Tehran has built over recent decades, based both on its missile programme and on its network of militias and armed organizations operating across different areas of the Middle East, from Lebanon to Iraq and Yemen.
Between expectations and reality…
If these were the expectations that accompanied the beginning of military operations, the evolution of the conflict will depend on a complex combination of variables which, already after two weeks of war, appear to be pushing developments away from the initial objectives of Washington and Tel Aviv.
The first dimension concerns Iran’s domestic dynamics. The resilience of the revolutionary regime and its ability to absorb the pressure of war without allowing it to translate into political destabilization represent a decisive factor, as does the economic resilience of a country already severely weakened by years of sanctions.
A second dimension concerns military variables. On one side, Israel and the United States possess overwhelming technological superiority; on the other, Iran can rely on a vast quantitative arsenal of less sophisticated drones and missiles that can nevertheless be deployed on a large scale. This asymmetry between quality and quantity raises questions about the sustainability of operations in the event of a prolonged conflict. At the same time, the expansion of the theatre of war cannot be ruled out, whether through the activation of Tehran’s regional militias and partners or if some actors recently targeted by Iranian attacks decide to retaliate.
A further layer concerns, precisely, the regional dimension. The position of the main powers in the area—from Turkey to the Gulf states—could contribute either to containing or amplifying the scale of the confrontation.
Finally, there is the systemic dimension linked to energy security. The Strait of Hormuz represents one of the world’s main chokepoints for hydrocarbon trade, and any disruption—as has already begun to occur in recent days—produces immediate effects on global energy markets. A prolonged escalation could therefore transform a regional crisis into a systemic problem, with direct repercussions on energy prices and the global economy.
It is through the interaction of these domestic, military, regional, and systemic variables that possible future developments of the crisis can be assessed. At present, three main trajectories appear likely to shape the evolution of the conflict.
Scenario 1 – Compromise
The first scenario is based on the assumption that the military pressure exerted by Israel and the United States could deepen existing fractures within Iran’s ruling elite. In recent days, several signals have suggested growing tensions between different centres of power within Tehran’s political system, particularly between the institutional-political establishment and the military apparatus of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Some statements by President Masoud Pezeshkian, quickly denied or downplayed by the Revolutionary Guards themselves, have offered a glimpse into these internal dynamics, revealing how Iran’s decision-making process may become increasingly fragmented as external pressure intensifies.
The political system of the Islamic Republic rests on a balance between different overlapping centres of power that both compete and constrain one another. This arrangement has demonstrated considerable resilience over the decades, but it is not necessarily immune to the shocks produced by a prolonged war.
In this context, a conflict destined to continue over time could alter internal power relations, strengthening those factions within the establishment that consider a direct and prolonged confrontation with the United States and Israel unsustainable. The most potentially destabilizing factor, however, would be a further intensification of Israeli-American strikes, particularly if they were to target senior political or military figures once again. At that point, some sectors of the Iranian leadership might conclude that continuing the conflict risks threatening the very survival of the revolutionary regime itself. Economic deterioration, aggravated by additional sanctions and the destruction of strategic infrastructure, could encourage the emergence of a more pragmatic current within Iran’s ruling establishment.
The energy dimension would play an ambiguous role in this scenario. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz represents an extraordinary pressure tool against the international community, but it is also a double-edged sword for Tehran. A prolonged global energy crisis could trigger an even harsher Western military response and weaken part of the diplomatic support Iran continues to rely on, beginning with China, which would be heavily exposed to the consequences of a prolonged closure of the strait.
Faced with these risks, a pragmatic leadership could agree to open negotiations with Washington. Any potential compromise—one that Tehran would likely perceive more as a surrender than as a settlement—would probably focus on three main issues that were already at the centre of tensions before the conflict: dismantling the nuclear programme, reducing support for regional militias, and limiting missile capabilities. In exchange, Iran would seek sanctions relief and, above all, implicit recognition of the survival of the Islamic Republic’s political system.
The critical challenge of such a solution, however, would lie precisely in the political price to be paid. In order to preserve the regime’s institutional architecture, Tehran would have to accept a substantial strategic defeat, abandoning a significant portion of the instruments through which it has built its regional influence over recent decades. Such a transition would be extremely delicate, risking the emergence of new internal fractures and undermining the legitimacy of the leadership in the eyes of those segments of the system whose power has been built around this strategy.
Making a negotiated solution even more complex is the very structure of Iranian power: large portions of the military, economic, and industrial apparatus are controlled by the IRGC and the Basij militias—the actors most ideologically uncompromising and least inclined toward a compromise with the enemy.
Scenario 2 – Collapse
A second scenario—one that would correspond to the initial expectations of Tel Aviv and Washington—envisions a far more destabilizing dynamic, in which military pressure, combined with internal vulnerabilities, leads to the progressive disintegration of Khomeinism. In such a case, an external conflict could evolve into a domestic political crisis.
Iran is a state characterized by considerable ethnic and territorial diversity, with several peripheral regions hosting communities that have historically expressed autonomist aspirations or opposition to central authority. In a situation of severe state weakening, armed groups could emerge or gain strength, particularly in areas with significant Kurdish or Azeri populations.
However, transforming these latent tensions into a genuine armed insurgency would be far from simple. Supplying weapons to domestic opposition groups or coordinating forces hostile to the revolutionary regime along Iran’s borders would present major logistical and political challenges.
The hypotheses circulated during the early stages of the conflict regarding possible involvement by Kurdish forces in Iraqi Kurdistan, for instance, do not appear to have translated into concrete action, demonstrating how difficult it is to transform these dynamics into an effective military lever against Tehran.
Such a development would allow Israel and the United States to achieve one of the strategic objectives that has long motivated segments of their respective leaderships. Yet it would also entail enormous risks. The collapse of Iran’s state apparatus could open a phase of territorial fragmentation and internal conflict, contributing to the destabilization of the entire region rather than its stabilization. The resulting power vacuum would inevitably be filled by competition among regional actors and external powers, with consequences that would be extremely difficult to predict for the stability of the wider area.
Turkey—the region’s main rising power—is also closely monitoring developments in the crisis. Ankara has no interest in seeing Iranian influence strengthened in the region, but it is equally wary of the prospect of a complete collapse of the Iranian state. Despite rivalry and competition, Turkish leadership would prefer to deal with a weakened Iran rather than face a scenario of state fragmentation, although the recent interception of Iranian missiles in Anatolian airspace risks generating new bilateral tensions.
Scenario 3 – Attrition
The third scenario, which currently appears to be the most plausible, assumes that Iran manages to absorb the impact of Western military operations while threatening to transform the conflict into a prolonged regional war of attrition—an outcome that would clearly push its adversaries, beginning with the United States, toward reconsidering their position. Iran’s strategy, developed over the past two decades, has been built precisely around the ability to compensate for technological inferiority through asymmetric warfare capabilities.
While Israel and the United States possess highly sophisticated military systems, these capabilities also entail extremely high costs and limitations in the production and availability of advanced munitions. Iran, by contrast, has invested in recent years in the large-scale development and production of relatively inexpensive drones and missiles capable of overwhelming enemy defence systems through sheer volume. It is no coincidence that a significant portion of Israeli and American operations has focused specifically on bombing launch sites and related storage facilities. However, it remains difficult to determine precisely how much these strikes have actually reduced Iran’s offensive capabilities and how much of its arsenal remains available or could be rapidly replenished.
Over the course of several weeks, this imbalance could produce significant operational effects. Should Israeli and American interceptor stocks decline rapidly, vulnerabilities would inevitably emerge in Washington’s ability to protect its regional allies.
This is precisely the element upon which a significant part of Iran’s strategy is based. Demonstrating that the United States lacks the material resources to simultaneously protect all of its regional partners would undermine one of the pillars of the security order Washington has built in the Middle East.
This raises the possibility that other actors aligned with Tehran could follow Hezbollah’s path, opening new pressure fronts across the region and contributing over time to the exhaustion of Israeli and American air defence systems. Yemen’s Houthis and the numerous Iraqi Shia militias represent the most immediate candidates, especially following the recent fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who described support for Iran as a “collective duty for the Shiite world.” Such a religious appeal could encourage greater mobilization among regional paramilitary forces.
The Energy Factor
An increasingly important role, however, is played by the energy dimension of the conflict. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz represents one of the most powerful strategic levers available to Iran.
If the war were to continue for weeks or months, the consequences would become even more significant. European countries would face a severe energy shock, but the United States’ regional partners in the Gulf—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar—would also be heavily affected. It is no coincidence that Tehran expanded its attacks to these countries from the earliest days of the conflict, with the aim of increasing indirect pressure on Washington.
In such a scenario, Iran’s strategic victory would essentially coincide with survival. The objective would not be to achieve battlefield superiority, but rather to prolong the conflict and progressively increase the economic, political, and military costs for its adversaries.
This gradual increase in costs could place Washington under pressure in the short term, eventually pushing it to accept certain concessions toward Tehran. A prolonged war of attrition would risk becoming increasingly unsustainable from both an economic and military perspective, while tensions in energy markets would fuel international pressure for a rapid stabilization.
At present, however, it is difficult to imagine what form such concessions could take, beyond at least preserving part of the capabilities that Washington originally sought to dismantle.
It is therefore not surprising that reports have already begun circulating in Washington about a possible reassessment of the situation and the White House’s willingness to bring the conflict to an end before it turns into an excessively costly commitment. Such a perspective, however, clashes with the Israeli position, according to which the war should continue for an extended period.
The West Asia of tomorrow
Overall, if the conflict were indeed to evolve along the trajectory outlined in the third scenario, the outcome would take on the characteristics of a strategic defeat for the United States and, at the same time, a victory for Iran. Not because Tehran would achieve military dominance on the battlefield, but because it would have succeeded in surviving the phase of maximum military and economic pressure exerted by its adversaries, transforming the confrontation into a war of attrition increasingly difficult for Washington and its allies to sustain. The United States could therefore find itself compelled to accept a compromise with Tehran that, while not formally amounting to surrender, would effectively carry its strategic implications. Such an outcome would represent one of the most significant failures—considering the relationship between the importance of the conflict and the level of involvement—from the end of the Second World War onward.
The implications of such an outcome would extend far beyond the Middle East. A perception of American retreat would inevitably reduce the confidence of regional partners in Washington’s ability to guarantee the security of the area. The Gulf states, which for decades have based their security on American protection, would increasingly question the reliability of that guarantee.
This would not go unnoticed in other strategic theatres either. In East Asia, where competition between the United States and China represents the main geopolitical axis of the twenty-first century, many of Washington’s allies could become increasingly cautious about openly aligning against Beijing if they came to believe that the United States is unable to sustain the burden of a prolonged confrontation to the end (something similar is already occurring in Europe). In this sense, a weakening of American credibility in the Middle East would indirectly strengthen the position of rival powers such as Russia, China, and, of course, Iran.
The deepest consequence of such a development, closely linked to the previous point, would concern the very principle upon which a significant portion of the contemporary international order has been built. Numerous countries that today delegate, to varying degrees, their security to an external protector would begin questioning the sustainability of this model. The fear that such a guarantor may not always be able—or willing—to intervene could push many states to independently strengthen their military capabilities, accelerating a trend toward greater strategic autonomy that, in the long term, risks making the international system even more unstable.

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