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United States-China: An (Un)avoidable War?

In 2004, I was concerned about a possible world war. In 2025, I am worried about a probable one. That said, world wars are not inevitable, and here lies a crucial lesson rooted in Western history: the Harmel Doctrine.

The Harmel Doctrine emerged after George Kennan’s Long Telegram, developed by a group of special representatives coordinated by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, under the leadership of NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio. It was a transatlantic effort aimed at providing strategic guidance to NATO on how to handle the political and military challenge posed by the Soviet Union—at a time when the alliance consisted of only fifteen countries, all sharing strong political and cultural affinities.

The Soviet Union was our adversary. While we were not in direct war, we were engaged in a multi-level, multi-front confrontation stretching from the dividing line between the two Germanys to the rest of the world, including Korea, Vietnam, decolonization-hit Africa, and Latin America. One of the doctrine’s core principles was the need to maintain both deterrence and dialogue simultaneously. This was a fundamental premise.

The Harmel Doctrine not only allowed the United States to maintain economic competitiveness—preventing it from falling into a military spending-driven economy—but also, in a way that served both American and Euro-Atlantic interests, enabled Europe’s reconstruction. Without this, Europe might have been crushed by yet another war. Rebuilding Europe eliminated the most fertile ground for communist ideology—poverty and inequality—while also buying time until the Soviet Union eventually imploded.

A victory through the implosion of one’s adversary is a war ending without winners or losers. At a certain point, the opponent simply fails to sustain its political model and collapses. The result was a decade of unchallenged American supremacy—though it was short-lived. But that is another discussion.

I bring up this story because we need a Harmel Doctrine for China. First, because China, despite what is often said, is not yet an enemy. Second, because there are very real and concrete interests that bind the two superpowers, the United States and China, both of which recognize shared threats. Furthermore, a significant segment of the American business community—particularly those who have built empires on data—has no interest in going to war. This is something that must be clearly understood.

There are shared interests in avoiding war, just as there are deep frictions over technology policies, espionage, cybersecurity, trade imbalances, and global competition—Taiwan being the most obvious flashpoint. However, these tensions are manageable. The first Trump administration was extremely tough on China, yet it never seriously considered or prepared for military conflict. We will see what the second term brings. We know Trump, but people change. This administration is far more structured than the previous one. We will also see the impact of Elon Musk-designed bureaucratic restructuring and how it translates into concrete political and strategic actions.

There is at least one area that may prove more promising than it currently appears: the Middle East, particularly in terms of security. Consider this: the Lebanon ceasefire was reached after the Biden administration came under pressure from the shadow of Trump’s return. One of Trump’s flagship foreign policy achievements was the Abraham Accords, which created a significant opportunity for peace in the Middle East—an opportunity, however, deeply undermined by the unresolved Palestinian issue. Without addressing that, progress toward broader and more effective normalization will remain difficult.

In the North African and Middle Eastern context, NATO’s southern partnerships can play a significant role. A framework for cooperation, cooperative security, and interoperability in strategic and military approaches is invaluable—yet has been sorely lacking for the past decade. I am not saying that functioning partnerships would have prevented certain crises, but they could have mitigated them far more effectively.

The war in Ukraine has provided at least three key lessons that are directly applicable to U.S.-China relations:

  1. War promises a lot but delivers little.
  2. Victory is often more illusory than it seems.
  3. The costs of war become evident in the short term and escalate over the medium term.

It is pointless to say, “In the long run, we are all dead.” The choices we make now shape the future—and this applies just as much to warfare as it does to climate change.

Finally, I want to highlight one last point. History shows that when competition degenerates into a large-scale war, all sides lose—often in ways they never anticipated. This is the unshakable lesson of both World War I and World War II, where even the so-called “victors” emerged as defeated powers, having lost their empires.

Great wars can push even the most powerful nations out of history. This is something worth remembering before taking the risk of plunging into what I call World War IV—the fourth because, while the Third World War was “cold” for us, it was anything but coldd for much of the world.

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