Demographic winter has become a concrete reality for most advanced nations and will be one of the key factors shaping international relations, state competition, and conflicts in the 21st century. The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war serves as a crucial case study for assessing the impact of demographic decline on warring nations, particularly the society led by President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government.
Ukraine’s Demographic Desertification
At the start of the war in February 2022, Ukraine had an estimated population of around 43 million people and was already experiencing a long-term demographic decline, primarily driven by emigration—a trend ongoing since 1994. This was further exacerbated by a persistently low fertility rate, which had remained below the natural replacement threshold (2.1 children per woman) since 1987.
Over the past 30 years, and with the additional impact of the Russian invasion, Ukraine’s population has shrunk by approximately 15 million people due to low birth rates, a lower life expectancy compared to Western countries, and significant outward migration to European and non-European nations.

In 2024, the United Nations estimated that Ukraine’s total population stood at 37.4 million, while the Central Intelligence Agency reported a figure of approximately 35.6 million. However, these numbers should be taken with caution, as the last official population census in the country dates back to 2001. The subsequent political, economic, and military upheavals have undoubtedly led to a further decline in population, making an accurate estimate difficult.
Outside Ukraine’s borders, there are approximately 6.9 million refugees dispersed across various European and non-European countries, including 1.3 million in Russia and Belarus, according to the latest UNHCR data. The actual number of residents in the oblasts under Ukrainian government control is likely between 28 and 30 million, though some believe the situation could be even worse—according to Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiga, the number of Ukrainians abroad had reached 7.5 million in 2024. Meanwhile, an estimated 6 million people reside in territories under Russian military control.

This already extremely precarious and dramatic situation is further exacerbated by the declining total fertility rate among Ukrainian women, which stood at 1.3 children per woman in 2023. In 2024, according to data from the Ministry of Justice, annual births dropped by 5.7% compared to the previous year, falling to 176,780, while deaths reached 495,090.
Due to continuous demographic decline, the median age of the population has surpassed 44 years, creating a significant imbalance in the population pyramid. This irregular structure, with very few young people—particularly in the 18–25 age group and among children under five—has had a direct impact on Ukraine’s military strategy since the beginning of the conflict. Initially, compulsory conscription targeted individuals aged 27–60, but in 2024, the lower limit was slightly reduced to 25 years.
The weight of demographic decline and the risk of losing a significant portion of the country’s younger population—either on the battlefield or through emigration—thus jeopardizing Ukraine’s future prospects and eventual reconstruction, forced the Zelensky government to exclude the 18–24 age group from mandatory recruitment. This decision led to tensions with the Biden administration and, later, with some of Trump’s advisors, both of whom favored conscripting this younger demographic.
Future Scenarios
Ukraine’s demographic outlook for the coming decades presents highly uncertain and concerning scenarios, largely dependent on the potential duration and outcome of the ongoing military conflict. In its report Ukraine’s Population Future After the Russian Invasion, the European Union’s Joint Research Centre outlines four possible scenarios:
- Prolonged War and Low Refugee Return: Extensive destruction of the country, slow reconstruction, and a persistent state of uncertainty.
- Permanent Emigration: The war is shorter, and many refugees return, but slow reconstruction fuels further long-term migration abroad.
- Circular Migration: The war is shorter, and many refugees return within the next ten years, but slow economic growth leads to continuous population movement.
- Transitory Migration: The war is shorter, the majority of refugees return to Ukraine, and economic growth—boosted by international aid—encourages further migration to the country during the 2030–2040 decade.

The scenarios outlined above should be considered relatively optimistic—even the “prolonged war” scenario—when considering the data emerging in 2024, which indicates an even lower population in Ukrainian-controlled territories, as well as ongoing military developments. Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed, Russian forces continue to advance, the number of Ukrainians fleeing abroad has increased in recent months, and the future reconstruction of the country remains an entirely uncertain prospect.
These factors make it increasingly difficult to predict Ukraine’s demographic trajectory in the coming years. However, three key trends and their potential impacts can still be analyzed: the return of refugees, post-war recovery, and pro-natalist policies.
The Return of Refugees
Uncertainty surrounding the course and ultimate duration of the war makes it difficult to provide quantitative assessments on the return of Ukrainian refugees. While a significant portion may return post-war, the actual number will be influenced by several factors:
- The level of destruction in eastern Ukraine, including severe environmental pollution and the millions of unexploded (and highly dangerous) devices left on the ground—cluster munitions alone pose a long-term threat of civilian casualties.
- The speed of industrial and economic reconstruction.
- The duration of the conflict itself.
If the war drags on for several more years, many Ukrainians will establish permanent roots in their host countries, making their return increasingly unlikely. Even a fragile truce, armistice, or peace agreement could slow down repatriation, as refugees may fear a renewed large-scale war and the possibility of further military conscription.
In particular, if the conflict results in a frozen war scenario, with both sides separated by a fragile demilitarized line, the Ukrainian leadership may feel compelled to maintain a large standing army—formed since 2022—through continued mandatory conscription campaigns. One of the primary reasons many Ukrainian men fled the country was to evade military service and the prospect of being forced into combat. Their return could be further hindered by the fear of repercussions: even if the Ukrainian government were to issue an amnesty to encourage draft evaders to return, hardline nationalist factions in a post-war Ukraine might strongly oppose their reintegration.
Similarly, fear of retaliation and repression may prevent refugees from returning to areas now under Russian control, particularly men who previously served in the Ukrainian armed forces. Moreover, potential discrimination based on language or political affiliation by the new administrations could further deter displaced populations from coming back.
The severe demographic crisis affecting European societies will likely lead EU governments to seek skilled workers and new labor forces from abroad, triggering competition for talent. This could further slow down the return of Ukrainian refugees, particularly those with mid- to high-level professional skills. Additionally, the rise of European governments hostile to migration from Africa and Asia might lead to selective and preferential labor and economic policies aimed at retaining Eastern European refugees within their host nations through various incentives and job opportunities.
Post-War Recovery
The European Union has pledged to finance part of Ukraine’s reconstruction, but these “assurances” remain highly uncertain and will depend on the evolution of the international system—both geopolitically and economically.
In February 2024, the World Bank, in collaboration with the European Commission, the United Nations, and the Ukrainian government, estimated that nearly $500 billion would be needed for Ukraine’s reconstruction. However, after another year of war and further destruction of infrastructure, this figure has likely risen to around $600 billion.
These estimates should be viewed conservatively, as they are subject to change based on the conflict’s evolution and will need to be reassessed with more thorough on-the-ground evaluations. What is certain is that rebuilding and demining Ukraine will require hundreds of billions of dollars, but securing these funds remains highly uncertain.
Several EU member states are facing economic crises and are bound by new budgetary restrictions under the Stability and Growth Pact, with urgent needs for internal investments in other sectors. Upcoming national elections could bring to power governments reluctant or outright opposed to investing large sums in Ukraine’s reconstruction. Additional international crises would undoubtedly have a negative impact on available resources.
The duration of the war also plays a crucial role in these scenarios. Many of Ukraine’s mineral resources are located in the eastern regions, some of which are now under Russian control, while maritime exports via the Black Sea remain vulnerable to renewed hostilities.
Even a fragile truce, armistice, or peace deal would likely hinder economic recovery, as private investors may be hesitant to commit to a potentially unstable market. Meanwhile, the United States, under a new Trump administration, appears far less inclined to provide extensive financial aid over the long term—especially if peace negotiations result in an outcome deemed unstable or unsatisfactory for U.S. strategic interests.
Birth Rates and Population Decline
In September 2024, the Ukrainian government approved a new strategy for the country’s demographic development, set to run until 2040, with planned three-year initiatives. These measures focus on six key objectives:
- Improving conditions for refugee return and reducing outward migration.
- Raising the total fertility rate through new policies supporting childbirth and families.
- Reducing premature mortality, increasing life expectancy, and providing special support for war invalids.
- Creating jobs with the goal of full employment.
- Adapting society to demographic aging, including policies promoting active longevity.
- Developing high living standards and transforming Ukraine into an attractive destination for foreigners.
The 2024–2040 Demographic Recovery Strategy will require significant resources and highly complex planning, particularly to overcome the numerous obstacles that will arise in the coming years. Some of these challenges relate to refugee return and economic reconstruction, as highlighted in previous sections. Others stem from the unique difficulties posed by the demographic winter affecting advanced industrial societies.
Countries with strong welfare states, such as those in Scandinavia, or those that have implemented extensive socioeconomic measures to counter declining birth rates—such as France, Japan, and South Korea—have failed to reverse fertility decline despite having substantial resources and far more stable internal conditions than Ukraine. The profound sociocultural shifts that have taken place on a global scale within advanced societies have neutralized traditional pro-natalist policies, ranging from financial incentives to the development of childcare infrastructure (e.g., nurseries) and family-friendly policies.
Moreover, the acceleration of digitalization appears to be contributing to the worsening birth rate collapse, alongside other challenges linked to the industrial-technological system: declining male fertility, widespread psychological distress, social atomization, increasing loneliness, a rise in single-person households, and shifting existential priorities among younger generations.
This combination of factors could undermine Ukraine’s demographic strategy and even negate the potential benefits of post-war recovery. The demographic booms observed in past post-conflict situations may not be replicated in Ukraine’s case, especially within the broader European social context of the 21st century.
In the short term, Ukraine’s only real hopes lie in a substantial refugee return rate—exceeding the estimated 63% projected in 2023—and in fostering a cultural, social, and political cycle capable of instilling deep optimism within the population.

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