The ambition of contemporary Turkey to hold together two seemingly divergent universalisms—one rooted in blood, embodied by Pan-Turkism, and the other grounded in history, expressed through Neo-Ottomanism—cannot be dismissed as a mere exercise in domestically oriented diplomatic rhetoric, nor as a simple flight of grandeur. On the contrary, it represents a high-risk geopolitical maneuver that seeks to stretch the boundaries of modern statehood while inevitably exposing the country to systemic vulnerabilities.
While tactical flexibility in shifting from one register to the other has so far delivered short-term gains for Ankara—allowing it to be Turanian in Baku and Islamic in Gaza—it is at the level of long-term strategy that the forced coexistence of these two grammars may generate dangerous friction. Such tension threatens not only to undermine the effectiveness of Turkey’s external projection, at times perceived as incoherent by regional partners, but also to weaken the resilience of the domestic social contract itself, reactivating identity fault lines that have never truly been healed.
The fragilities of an ambitious yet contradictory model
It is precisely along this seismic fault line that the current trajectory of Erdoğan’s presidency unfolds. While keeping the Turanian flame alive for the steppes of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkey’s leadership appears to be decisively pivoting toward a distinctly Neo-Ottoman practice and narrative. This shift is not driven by nostalgia alone, but by a precise political calculation: the attempt to construct a moral legitimacy that is alternative—and superior—to the liberal Western one. This strategic recalibration is clearly reflected in the powerful narrative architecture built in recent years, designed to portray Turkey not as one nation among many, forced to play by rules set by others, but as the rightful heir to a civilization portrayed as intrinsically more just, ordering, and tolerant.
Erdoğan’s statements often read like a manifesto of this countervailing moral universalism, one that asserts ethical superiority rooted in historical legacy. The so-called Pax Ottomana is presented as a model of peaceful coexistence among different faiths, sharply contrasted with an West depicted as historically sectarian and exclusionary. The underlying ambition of this rhetoric is considerable: to frame Turkish hegemony not as a form of neo-colonial domination, but as a protective “umbrella” of order and civilization that guarantees pluralism—thereby legitimizing the return of the Sublime Porte to its former provinces.
Yet it is precisely in its confrontation with domestic reality and with the deep “machinery” of the state that this rhetoric encounters its most evident limits. While the political leadership solemnly proclaims that diversity is not a source of division and that citizenship is an inclusive bond, the actual dynamics of power tell a story of constant friction. The persistence of the Pan-Turkic “code”—sustained by the governing alliance with nationalist forces and deeply embedded within the security apparatus—ends up “thickening” national identity around ethnicity and language.
This dualism gives rise to what might be described as an institutional schizophrenia. On the one hand, the state promises a supranational Neo-Ottoman embrace, potentially open to Kurds, Arabs, and Alevis in the name of a shared historical and geographical belonging. On the other, it often acts through the conditioned reflexes of republican nationalism, which perceives any claim to cultural specificity not as an imperial asset, but as a threat to the indivisible unity of the nation. The result is that the promise of Islamic brotherhood or Ottoman tolerance risks being perceived by domestic minorities not as an offer of equal citizenship, but as a mere ideological cover for an ethno-religious dominance that leaves little room for genuine political pluralism.
This inconsistency between imperial-scale rhetoric and nationalist governing practice is not the product of carelessness; it is rooted instead in a deep historical syndrome that continues to unsettle the Turkish establishment beneath the surface: the still vivid and traumatic memory of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. It is reasonable to assume that, for the most uncompromising guardians of Kemalist republican ideology and for Pan-Turkists alike, activating imperial memory represents a serious danger unless it is tightly controlled. The underlying concern is not a rejection of power as such, but the fear that accommodating excessive internal diversity or projecting influence into too many external “provinces”—such as Syria, Libya, or the Balkans—could once again trigger the fatal mechanism that sealed the fate of the Sublime Porte.
According to a recurring historical reading within these circles, peripheral nationalism emerged by exploiting the empire’s overextension and the gradual weakening of the center, ultimately contributing to its disintegration. Consequently, nationalists fear that reopening the “Pandora’s box” of imperial narrative, with its implicit recognition of multiethnicity, would amount to contaminating once again the essential core of the modern Turkish nation—painstakingly purified and unified by Atatürk. Looking ahead, there is a concern that a Neo-Ottoman model too faithful to its original form could burden the Anatolian core with unsustainable economic and military costs to maintain distant provinces, diverting vital resources from domestic priorities and risking, by contagion, the reawakening of autonomist claims among internal minorities.
The Past, an Unheeded Teacher?
It is within the intrinsic contradictions of the Turkish model that the most complex reflection on the nature of Ankara’s current projection takes shape. The insoluble knot—one that simultaneously fuels nationalist anxieties and constrains external action—lies in the specific “imperial mode” Turkey is now attempting to adopt.
A closer look at this mode reveals how sharply it diverges from historically more inclusive and syncretic imperial models—from Rome to the classical Ottomans—which were able to dilute the dominant ethnic element in order to co-opt and integrate peripheral elites. This rigidity, however, is not the result of a misstep or a cultural incapacity; rather, it is a deliberate choice, born of a precise historical lesson drawn from 1918. For decades, a significant strand of Turkish political thought has argued that one of the primary causes of Ottoman dissolution was precisely the Empire’s excessive “cosmopolitanization,” which ultimately diluted Turkish identity and left the state hostage to its non-Turkish components.
As a result, the current strategy appears to pursue a paradoxical form of “cold fusion”: recovering the Empire’s space and influence without accepting its identity compromises. For strategic necessity, Ottoman narrative and Islamic solidarity are redeployed as instruments of soft power in the former provinces—the Balkans, the Middle East, and Africa—to gain strategic depth. At the same time, this outward push is underpinned by hard power and a state structure that remains rigorously Pan-Turkist, in order to prevent what is perceived as a dangerous “dilution” of the national core. It is an attempt to reap the benefits of empire—influence, markets, geopolitical centrality—without paying its political costs, such as the cession of sovereignty, federal arrangements, or reciprocal cultural assimilation.
The result is a geopolitical oxymoron: nationalist imperialism. Unlike Rome, which Romanized its provinces while simultaneously allowing itself to be Hellenized and Orientalized—absorbing deities and granting citizenship as a legal status detached from blood—Turkey’s current projection advances a one-directional model. It seeks to export a specific notion of Turkishness—language, a state-centered interpretation of Islam, national symbols—without taking the reciprocal step of allowing itself to be shaped or adapted by local cultures.
This approach—aimed at armoring Turkish identity while projecting it outward—exposes Ankara to the risk of a double rejection. Externally, in former non-Turkophone provinces such as the Arab world, Africa, and the Balkans, this mode of projection risks being perceived not as the benevolent return of a historical protector, but as an arrogant form of neo-colonialism. If Turkey does not adapt to local cultures and instead seeks merely to overlay them with its own security agenda, it will be seen as a foreign body—one to be expelled at the first opportunity. Internally, the inability to manage this synthesis renders Erdoğan’s imperial rhetoric hollow for anyone who does not fit neatly within the Turkish-Sunni canon, sharpening the grievances of minorities who experience history repeating itself in the form of exclusion rather than inclusion.
Ultimately, Turkey finds itself in a precarious state of unstable equilibrium. It pursues the grandeur and geographic reach of empire while jealously preserving the exclusivism and rigidity of the nation-state. Unless it succeeds in evolving toward a model capable of managing this contradiction, there is a real risk that geopolitical expansion will erode the very foundations of power—and that internal tensions, fueled by the specter of overextension, will fracture society, leaving the country too large and ambitious to remain a simple nation, yet too rigid and closed to become a true Eurasian empire.
Condemned to Act
Contemporary Turkey stands out as a paradigmatic laboratory for post-imperial powers. It seeks to remain universal without resorting to outright conquest, combining two registers that speak different languages of the same ambition. Pan-Turkism invokes blood, language, and genealogy; Neo-Ottomanism calls upon faith, memory, and an ordering function. These are not irreconcilable ideologies, but instruments that—if skillfully orchestrated—allow Ankara to reject the notion that the borders of 1923 constitute an immutable destiny. Yet their coexistence is inherently fragile: an ethnic universalism loses part of its imperial potential if it is not tempered; an imperial universalism forfeits its inclusive force if the civic core is perceived as hierarchically superior. The challenge, therefore, is not to choose between the two registers, but to turn their contradiction into an operational method.
In this sense, the convergence of Pan-Turkism and Neo-Ottomanism should not be read as a mere narrative compromise, but as the very mechanism that makes Turkey’s current centrality possible. If the task is not to select one register over the other but to transform their tension into a working method, then it must be acknowledged that this synthesis operates on two simultaneous—and only seemingly compatible—planes: it is both a strategic resource and a structural constraint.
On the one hand, it represents a genuine opportunity. Possessing two grammars of power allows Ankara to speak multiple geopolitical languages at once, to enter several arenas without being trapped within a single affiliation. Pan-Turkism opens corridors of affinity toward the East, offers a reference community, and generates trust and predictability within Turkophone networks. Neo-Ottomanism, by contrast, provides a vocabulary of memory and order capable of legitimizing Turkey’s presence in the wider Mediterranean and the Islamic world without resorting to an overtly expansionist project.
Together, these two registers enhance Turkey’s connective capacity. The country can appear “familiar” in Baku and “central” in Tripoli, “indispensable” in the Caucasus and “authoritative” in the Levant, precisely because it is not compelled to be just one thing. In this sense, the synthesis constitutes a competitive advantage: not an ideological embellishment, but a device that multiplies points of access, reduces isolation, and broadens the range of instruments at Ankara’s disposal.
But this same convergence is also a necessity—not something Ankara freely chooses, but something it is compelled to practice in order to hold its own internal balance together. Contemporary Turkey cannot be reduced to just two cultural currents; yet much of its political life gravitates along a deeper fault line that concerns the very definition of the political community itself: on one side, a rigid ethnic nation; on the other, a post-imperial center capable of ordering and governing difference. As long as this tension remains confined within the state, it tends to turn into a struggle over legitimacy and over the country’s direction; it is therefore “resolved” obliquely, by displacing it outward.
International action becomes the arena in which the two souls can be simultaneously satisfied without ever having to be reconciled at the theoretical level. Ankara seeks theaters where success can speak in two registers at once—offering Pan-Turkic nationalism proof of strength and identity continuity, while providing Neo-Ottomanism with evidence of prestige, protection, and an ordering role. Here, synthesis is less a foreign-policy choice than a method of managing domestic dissent: a way of converting an internal contradiction into outward motion.
This synthesis is both weapon and sentence. A weapon, because it expands the range of action and makes Ankara adaptive; a sentence, because it forces the country to continuously demonstrate, through visible results, that this dual grammar is not a fiction. In the absence of success, convergence loses its mediating function: what externally appears as versatility is revealed internally as incoherence, and the contradiction—no longer offset by effectiveness—falls back upon the social contract. For this reason, the coexistence of the two universalisms cannot remain static: it must either generate tangible returns—stability, economic gains, diplomatic victories—or collapse into its opposite. It is precisely here that one understands why, for Ankara, activism is not merely an option, but a condition of equilibrium.
Precisely because of the diversity and friction between Pan-Turkism and Neo-Ottomanism, the only realistic way to keep them together without producing dangerous internal or external fractures is for the strategy that binds them to deliver concrete and visible successes. As long as there are tangible results to display, internal tensions can be temporarily suspended: external prestige absorbs and legitimizes contradictions. But this dynamic comes with a clear political and strategic cost—it imposes on Turkey a built-in propensity for action. Stasis becomes corrosive; without successes to showcase, symbolic cohesion erodes and internal divisions resurface with force.
Winning in Order to Survive
The pursuit of operational success drives Ankara to intervene where it can secure rapid and visible results—as seen over the past decade in Syria, the South Caucasus, Libya, selected initiatives in Africa, spheres of influence in Central Asia, and even in Gaza—and to cultivate theaters where symbolic and economic returns are immediate.
The synthesis between the two universalisms is therefore not a static condition, but a kinetic equilibrium. The fusion of the Turanian and Ottoman souls is possible only in motion, through outward projection. In stasis, these identity components no longer blend; they sink and crystallize into internal contradictions ready to collide.
This “condemnation to movement” will in all likelihood push Ankara toward its next frontier: the sea, according to the grammar of Mavi Vatan (“Blue Homeland”). Turkey’s strategic necessity here is twofold and very concrete. On the one hand, it must consolidate control over the waters off its own coasts and over the belt of islands and micro-maritime spaces that—especially in the Aegean—risk constraining its strategic depth and freedom of action. On the other hand, it must seek outposts and leverage beyond the chokepoints that threaten to turn the Mediterranean into a “closed” sea dominated by others.
Along this trajectory, Ankara will tend to translate the Blue Homeland into naval presence, delimitation agreements, protection of energy corridors, and the establishment of logistical hubs in friendly ports. An increase in friction with Greece and Cyprus will be almost inevitable, because redefining maritime space necessarily means brushing up against the edges of others’ sovereignty. Yet, in the Turkish logic, this is a necessary risk—not to expand for expansion’s sake, but to prevent the Mediterranean from closing in around Turkey like a cage made of islands, lines, and bottlenecks.
Ultimately, Turkey finds itself condemned to greatness in order to avoid confronting its own fractures. Its trajectory is an unrelenting race to stitch together the tear between the nomad’s tent and the emperor’s dome, attempting to overlay the infinite horizon of the steppe onto the blue depth of the sea. It is in this tension that the secret of Turkey’s new universalism lies: an ambitious attempt to prove that one can be both root and bridge at the same time—no longer the periphery of someone else’s empire, but the gravitational center of its own renewed destiny.

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