Turchia Russia e Iran

The (New) Central Empires Claim Their Space – Part I

Historically, the relations between Russia, Turkey, and Iran have been marked by continuous struggles and wars for hegemony in regions adjacent to them: from the Black Sea to Central Asia, from the Caucasus down south along the course of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and today, extending to distant North Africa.

Rivalries driven by geographical proximity and the need to create a security space that inevitably results in an extension of influence over surrounding territories. This is because:

Their national policies are essentially based on the principle that the only “adequate” level of security is to be dominant in the geographical spaces where they compete, or, if this is not possible, to form temporary alliances to prevent any of the others from achieving dominance.

However, since the nineteenth century, their relations have also (and primarily) been influenced by the emergence of global powers. From the “European Century” to the World Wars, and finally the Cold War, the rise of superpowers and their different geographical positions have shaped the status of these empires.

Old Powers in a New World

Today, we find ourselves in an unprecedented situation for a globalized world. If we look at the area between the Middle East and Gibraltar, we see that the two current superpowers, the United States and China, are for the first time positioned at opposite ends of the planet. Never before have they been so far from the Eurasian crossroads. This is an absolute novelty in recent centuries, if not even in an absolute sense.

European nations had long been the global powers until the end of World War II. Afterward, they were supplanted by the United States and the Soviet Union—the latter having become a global power after centuries as a regional one.

In each of these cases, there was at least one superpower located near the territory that, moving from east to west, connects Asia to Europe and Africa, and opens to the Mediterranean. Powers that, inevitably, could exercise direct control and influence in the spaces occupied by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, compromising their territorial integrity and strategic autonomy.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, the balance in the “middle land” began to shift. Europe remained firmly within the American sphere of influence, and the European architecture, more economic than political, allowed any strategic aspirations to be suppressed. The Middle Eastern situation, however, was different. The United States no longer had the pressing need to block Soviet expansionism.

Thus, over the years, old powers have reemerged from the shadows, demanding more space and geopolitical weight in the name of a glorious past. While the geographical distance of Washington and Beijing provides more maneuvering room for the three powers, the fear that the extremes might converge toward the center (in terms of conflict or a “negotiated partition” of the planet) gives them terrible nightmares.

What has been the center of the world for millennia has now become nothing more than “in between.” Russia, Turkey, and Iran are squeezed towards the center, in a funnel that extends from the Caucasus to the south. The Middle East remains the space to contest in order to extend influence and secure safety. Africa is a “pressure release” ground where they seek partners, gather resources, secure logistical footholds to expand their sphere of influence, and increase their power status.

Thus, a spontaneous question arises: In such a context, do the historical rivalries between Moscow, Ankara, and Tehran increase the risk of conflict over contested spaces, or do they, on the contrary, force them to collaborate to avoid sliding irreparably into one of the two blocs (Chinese or American)?

Decoding the Bear, the Lion, and the Wolf

Russia, especially since the conflict in Ukraine, has begun to slip under China’s wing. This has become a necessary condition for survival after the doors of the West have obviously been closed to it.

The medium-to-long-term risk is that this junior partnership may turn into vassalage out of necessity. This Russian fear is more understandable when considering their historical relationship, which informs us of centuries of rivalry and conflict between the two empires. Starting from the 17th century over control of Siberia and Manchuria, continuing in the 19th century when, with the Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860) treaties, Russia acquired territories east of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, and culminating in the 20th century when ideological affinities failed to curb geopolitical rivalries, leading to the rupture of relations in 1960 and the border conflict over the Ussuri in 1969. It wasn’t until the 1980s, as the Soviet Union began its decline, that relations began to improve.

Iran, for its part, has been on a collision course with the West for a long time, but only in recent years—since China showed interest in the Middle East—has it begun to form important relationships with the People’s Republic of China. The events of October 7, 2023, and what followed, have further bolstered Chinese initiatives. This could become a problem for Iran, which, like Russia, may find itself forced into Beijing’s embrace to shield itself from the dangers coming from the West.

Despite the inevitability of looking more to the East than the West, Iranians always recall the motto that adorns the facade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1979, symbolizing their autonomy: “Neither East nor West, Islamic Republic.”

On the opposite front is Turkey, which, among the three, is the one most benefiting from this context. Already a NATO member, it has no qualms about pursuing its imperial agenda, even though it often contradicts the alliance to which it belongs. Hostility with the United States arises from the fear of having to abandon its ambitions by conforming to the American strategy. For this reason, it has been trying for years to counterbalance U.S. influence by forging ties with its rivals—chiefly Russia and China. Its recent application to join BRICS+ is a response to this need: standing with one foot in two (or more) camps has become Ankara’s modus vivendi.

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