In the 1970s, a rising Asian power close to the Middle East—one that Israel feared for its radical ideology—managed to develop a nuclear arsenal, despite immense obstacles: sabotage, assassinations, Mossad plots, and constant threats of nuclearization. That country was Pakistan.
Although Pakistan was far more preoccupied with India than with Israel, it had supported Arab powers and Palestinian guerrillas with weapons, fighters, and trainers since 1948. For Israeli intelligence, a nuclear-armed Pakistan was a latent threat that needed to be stopped. This is the forgotten—and nearly unknown—story of Israel’s secret war on Islamabad’s nuclear program.
“Islamabad Must Not Have the Bomb!”
Pakistan had a rapidly growing population, untapped natural resources, and significant soft power over the Muslim world of South and Central Asia. More importantly, it was the birthplace of ideological currents—like Deobandi Islam, the guiding star of the future Taliban—that deeply concerned Israel.
By the early 1970s, Pakistan had begun developing a military nuclear program, and Israel had decided it had to be stopped. The United States agreed, as did India and, unusually, the Soviet Union. Pakistan had entrusted the protection of its nuclear ambitions to its newly formed intelligence agency, the ISI, and could count on a few relatively weak supporters—China, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.
Work began in 1974, recruiting Pakistani nationals based in Europe or trained in the West. Their mission: steal nuclear secrets and establish front companies to traffic uranium and dual-use nuclear technologies.
While in the Netherlands, Abdul Qadeer Khan pulled off an astonishing theft of documents from the companies FDO and URENCO. Meanwhile, the ISI created front companies in the United Arab Emirates to mask uranium trafficking. After two years, the CIA caught wind of the operation.
Pakistan Against the World
By 1976, the ISI had recorded the first physical sabotage attempts against its nuclear sites, along with plots to assassinate scientists—mostly orchestrated by the CIA and KGB. But Western and Soviet intelligence faced a major handicap: they were operating on foreign, unfamiliar ground. As a result, in 1979, the ISI dismantled the CIA’s infiltration network during Operation Rising Sun, led by the legendary spy Imtiaz Ahmed.
Among those arrested during Rising Sun was Rafiq Safi Munsh, apprehended by the ISI while trying to deliver nuclear documents to the U.S. consulate in Karachi. That same year, French ambassador Pol Le Gourrierec and his secretary Jean Forlot were detained and expelled for photographing the Kahuta nuclear facility.
With Western allies failing, Israel decided to act alone. Not long after destroying Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure in Operation Babylon (1981), it sent a fleet of F-15s and F-16s toward Pakistan to bomb nuclear facilities identified by the CIA, KGB, and India’s RAW.
But Pakistan detected the incoming Israeli strike force, triggering an aerial standoff that ended with Israel backing down. Perhaps it was for the best. Had the Israeli Air Force succeeded, the ISI had planned a massive retaliation: launching every available Pakistani military and civilian aircraft in a suicidal assault on Israel.
Some reports suggest India played a role in thwarting the IAF’s surprise raid, warning Pakistan of Israel’s intentions. A move of realpolitik: India didn’t want Pakistan to go nuclear, but neither did it want a war erupting along its borders—especially one in which Pakistan would surely blame it for collusion.
Pakistan Refuses to Bow
The Mossad moved to Plan B: parcel bombs sent to European companies—primarily in West Germany—that were selling dual-use technologies to Pakistan. Meanwhile, Washington was negotiating with General Zia ul-Haq, who had overthrown President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977, with U.S. backing, to persuade him to halt the nuclear program.
The U.S. believed Zia would comply. He had executed Bhutto and expelled the Libyans—who had co-financed the program with the Saudis—from the nuclear initiative. It seemed they were close. Washington appeared on the brink of securing a last-minute halt to the program—when Zia changed his mind.
Zia had come to understand that the bomb would elevate Pakistan’s status and serve as a deterrent against India. He reassured Washington that Islamabad would not use nuclear weapons against Tel Aviv—on the condition that Israel cease its hostilities toward the program. In 1983, Pakistan conducted its first test. The unassuming nation had won its solitary war against some of the most powerful players in the international system.
Since then, only one state hostile to the Western bloc has succeeded in following Pakistan’s path: North Korea. Others—like Libya and Iraq—failed. And if Israel and Iran entered the worst crisis in their history in 2025, it’s because Iran, too, has inched dangerously close to the decisive moment.

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