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The Abelardo Playbook

Colombia’s presidential election was a street fight for control of the narrative. In the end, whoever controlled the story controlled reality.

Let’s talk about how campaigns are built for a political brawl. In 1997, Eric S. Raymond published an essay entitled The Cathedral and the Bazaar to explain two contrasting approaches to software development. That same framework offers a useful lens through which to understand the communication strategies behind Colombia’s recent presidential campaigns.

The cathedral is the hierarchical model: carefully designed from the top down, structured, centralized, and controlled by a single authority. It is the model traditionally associated with corporate software development.

The bazaar, by contrast, is the open-source model. It brings together a diverse community of contributors in a noisy, decentralized, and collaborative environment. People join in, make changes, build upon each other’s work, and gradually take ownership of the project. There is usually a leader—the host of the bazaar—who provides enough direction to keep the creative chaos from falling apart.

Now let’s apply this framework to Colombia’s presidential race.

Abelardo’s campaign was a cathedral: a sealed bunker where a small group of consultants dictated every move. Nothing was spontaneous; everything was carefully calculated. In this case, however, calculation came at the expense of originality. The campaign blueprint was assembled by borrowing from successful right-wing campaigns elsewhere: the tiger echoed Javier Milei’s lion, the neatly trimmed beard recalled Nayib Bukele, the national football jersey came straight from Jair Bolsonaro’s playbook, and the aggressive verbal barrage bore Donald Trump’s unmistakable imprint.

To mobilize voters, the campaign built a pyramid-style referral system reminiscent of DMG, rewarding supporters for recruiting others. WhatsApp automation and sophisticated micro-targeting ensured that every voter heard precisely what they wanted to hear—even when the messages contradicted one another. Elderly and vulnerable voters were promised expanded welfare benefits through SISBEN, while urban youth were told the state would be reduced by forty percent.

It was a highly sophisticated operation powered by big data, artificial intelligence, and synthetic messaging. Like the candidate himself, it was polished to perfection—almost artificial. Its strategy relied on marketing through manipulation: prizes, bonuses, and rewards designed to soothe people’s most immediate anxieties while offering little more than illusions. The underlying cause itself mattered far less.

Cepeda’s campaign, meanwhile, initially tried to be a cathedral as well—but its architects were drawing the plans for a tiny chapel without realizing it. Whether through complacency or the arrogance of assuming victory was inevitable, they seemed to dust off outdated left-wing campaign manuals from the 1970s and marched into battle against a Death Star armed with little more than nostalgia.

Many people recognized the problem. They tried to help, knocking anxiously on the campaign’s doors with ideas for a stronger, more competitive strategy. But convinced they embodied the purest cathedral in the galaxy, the campaign refused to let anyone in.

Round One: Death Star vs. Slingshot

Abelardo’s communications strategy perfectly reflected his political cause—but that cause was less a coherent vision than a mood built around resentment and revenge. Because it lacked substance, it depended on manipulation to sustain itself: the lightness of cruelty and the cruelty of lightness. His vision of the country was a mythical promised land sustained by fantasy and emotional fervor.

His campaign relentlessly attacked Cepeda, insulting him, unleashing AI-generated symbolic assaults while remaining safely protected inside its own armored bubble. Audiences watched the political bloodshed inflicted on the supposed representative of the “left-wing plague,” accompanied by digital fireworks that generated collective excitement.

Cepeda’s campaign refused to play by those rules. It neither attacked nor defended itself. Instead, it absorbed every blow, convinced that its message of development with social justice would speak for itself. Meanwhile, Abelardo’s slick, synthetic operation understood exactly how to manipulate emotions. It was superficial—but devastatingly effective.

Such manipulation cannot easily be defeated by an equally manipulative counterstrategy, especially when it enjoys vast financial resources and the support of the political establishment. Cepeda’s campaign rightly remained faithful to its principles, but it forgot one crucial reality: it was bringing a slingshot to a communications battle against the Death Star.

While Cepeda’s campaign remained pure, closed, grey, uninspiring, and tinged with sectarianism, Abelardo’s combined technique, tactics, strategy, aggressive enthusiasm, and the mass distribution of videos across thousands of WhatsApp groups. The first-round results reflected that advantage: 43.78% to 40.98% in Abelardo’s favour.

Halftime: Cepeda Tends His Wounds

We already know how Abelardo’s campaign won the opening round. Now we enter the losing camp, where Cepeda’s team struggles to understand what went wrong.

Its greatest mistake was failing to think like Zohran Mamdani, New York City’s newly elected mayor. The campaign believed that embracing digital communication would somehow betray the candidate’s authenticity and reduce politics to manipulation. The opposite was true.

A political cause can be expressed through communication without sacrificing its integrity. Good communication clarifies, strengthens, and gives meaning to a candidate’s vision while exposing an opponent’s manipulative tactics. Mamdani understood this—and won because of it.

Cepeda’s campaign still had time to learn the lesson by embracing digital media, audiovisual storytelling, and urban audiences. So what did it decide to do? Copy Mamdani’s visual style.

Good heavens—that entirely missed the point. The lesson was never to imitate his aesthetics but to adopt his way of thinking about digital campaigning. Still, it was a start. At least the campaign was no longer grey.

Round Two: The Chapel Falls, the Bazaar Rises

The far-right campaign increasingly looked—and felt—like the inevitable winner. Confidence among its supporters continued to grow. Meanwhile, the tiny chapel on the left that had imagined itself a cathedral finally began to collapse. Ironically, that was the best thing that could have happened.

Cepeda’s campaign ceased to belong solely to Cepeda; it became the people’s campaign. Supporters climbed through the windows and kicked down the walls of the chapel. Remember the bazaar? That is precisely what emerged. And for Cepeda’s political cause, the bazaar proved a far better model than the cathedral. Nothing better embodied a campaign centred on social justice than ordinary citizens taking ownership of the message—telling the story in their own videos, images, and words.

Yet every bazaar still needs a host capable of giving purpose to creative chaos. Cepeda’s reserved temperament initially made him reluctant to assume that role. Gradually, however, the dynamics of the race began to change. His campaign’s audiovisual production improved dramatically—or rather, it finally began to exist. At last, it fought back. It attacked. It used political jiu-jitsu, throwing Abelardo to the ground more than once.

This contest was never simply about punches and kicks. It represented a clash between two opposing visions of Colombia: Cepeda’s social democracy versus Abelardo’s libertarianism combined with authoritarian surveillance; human creativity versus automation; spontaneity versus manipulation.

Abelardo’s campaign resembled ultra-processed American junk food—highly addictive and expertly marketed.

Cepeda’s campaign gradually realized that the bazaar itself was its greatest communications advantage. People built their own stalls using the only resource they possessed in abundance: creativity.

The two competing political causes could hardly have found more fitting forms of expression than these two radically different communication models.

Final Round: The Ending Had Already Been Written

In the closing stretch of this political street fight, Abelardo’s campaign increasingly revealed its authoritarian instincts. Journalists were publicly stigmatized, media outlets subjected to coordinated digital attacks, and several YouTube channels were hacked.

Only in the final days did Cepeda begin to resemble the genuine host of the popular communications bazaar that had taken over his campaign. He arrived late, but he was finally seen walking among the people, speaking with them, explaining and defending his political project, and showing how he intended to turn it into reality.

He landed flying kicks on his far-right opponent while displaying the patience of a Tibetan monk: listening calmly to hippie songs, chatting with K-pop fans, and appearing on online comedy shows. At last, the street fighter emerged. At last, he laughed—and made others laugh. He told his own story, recounted his journey, and read the poem his father had written for him before being murdered when Cepeda was still a child, leaving many listeners in tears.

The popular bazaar awoke just as time was running out. By then, the cathedral of silicone had fully exposed its authoritarian nature—but it had already done enough damage. Big-data machines are not defeated by good intentions; they are defeated at the ballot box. On election day, the creativity of the streets simply did not generate enough votes to overcome the braggart’s algorithm. The margin was just 0.96 percentage points.

The cathedral has taken power, but bazaars cannot be shut down by decree.

Those who choose instead to complain about how ugly politics has become while clinging to moral purity should not be surprised if, for the next four years, they are served donkey meat for lunch.

The campaign may be over. The bazaar has only just begun. See you in the fray.

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