In 1948, the United States launched the Marshall Plan, which was, unsurprisingly, a godsend for Europe. The goal was to pull European states away from the Soviet Union by tying them to America’s vast investments and exporting the “American way of life” that would become not just a national trademark but almost a creed. Then came NATO, whose secondary strategic purpose—after containing the Soviet Union—was wryly summed up by Lord Ismay as “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” Since then, little has changed: Washington still sees Europe as its “second backyard.”
America and Us
The United States was—and remains—an imperial power (even if it has always officially rejected that label, as a country born out of defeating the British Empire in the name of liberty and the pursuit of happiness). Specifically, it is a global, sea-dominant power. By blending Admiral Alfred Mahan’s principles on controlling sea lanes and chokepoints with Nicholas Spykman’s Rimland theory, America could never risk an autonomous geopolitical actor capable of challenging it across the Atlantic—perhaps even in collusion with the Soviet Union. NATO’s umbrella, therefore, served—and still serves—precisely that purpose as well.
European states might have been allowed to create an economic community—as indeed happened in its various forms, starting with the ECSC—but genuine strategic autonomy, underpinned by military power, was never going to be granted to any European entity. Moreover, establishing a military alliance in Europe, formally extending America’s nuclear umbrella across the continent, meant pushing its defensive line forward against the Soviet Union. On one hand, it created a deterrent for Moscow, which suddenly found U.S., French, and British missiles practically on its doorstep; on the other, it made it crystal clear that any direct clash with the Soviets would be fought on European soil—including with American nuclear weapons, as President Truman specified during the April 3, 1949, meeting with the foreign ministers of NATO’s founding members. These strategic assumptions are not relics of a bygone era; they remain relevant today.
Despite Washington’s signals—dating back to the first Obama administration and its “pivot to Asia”—that America’s strategic imperatives lie in the Pacific and concern China, no U.S. president has ever seriously questioned America’s presence in Europe. Even Trump’s second administration, aside from its noisy and abrasive remarks about “European freeloaders,” never actually challenged NATO or America’s military and strategic footprint on the continent. In fact, to reaffirm Washington’s strategic grip on Europe, in early June 2025 Trump appointed Grynkewich (former director of operations for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and head of U.S. European Command. Hardly the mark of abandoning Europe or NATO.
Tariffs, Deficits, and Dollars…
On the economic front, the United States imported vast quantities of all kinds of goods from Europe, without exporting anything close to an equivalent amount—simply because it couldn’t produce certain products domestically. Such a trade imbalance in Europe’s favor was very much a deliberate geopolitical choice:
- They further bind their European satellites to themselves, making the economies of the Old Continent heavily dependent on the demands of the American market.
- They bolster the dollar by fueling global demand for this stable, easily convertible currency—and for dollar-denominated assets. In this way, the dollar can begin to be stockpiled as a reserve or used in international contracts, gradually becoming a reference currency. “Dollarization,” and running deficits with other countries, come at the cost of industrial disengagement at home—but that’s another story.
- They ensure a safe harbor for European exports, preventing their industries from contracting too severely. Economically as well, then, the relationship between the United States and Europe is driven by geopolitical motives—namely, to remain indispensable to Europe.
No Strategic Autonomy on the Horizon
What has been outlined confirms that Europe could never have been an active player in the negotiations over the Trump–von der Leyen trade agreement, instead playing the role of an object that, in fact, becomes further tied to Washington through the arms and energy purchase provisions of the deal.
Keeping Europe within the American sphere of influence—regardless of the president, although Trump’s stance and policies toward Europe are probably the toughest since the postwar era—is a primary interest of Washington. The European “third way” is therefore not realistically feasible. Or rather, it could be, but only if the United States were to implode—a scenario that is unrealistic today, though not entirely implausible in the future.

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