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Bin Laden Has Won

On an October 7th like today, but back in the increasingly distant year of 2001, George Walker Bush launched the invasion of Afghanistan, ruled by Mullah Omar, accused of complicity in the 9/11 attacks—thus beginning the so-called War on Terror.

It was the greatest display of American power in Eurasia since the Vietnam War, taking place at the height of the Unipolar Moment, with the tepid support of “Old Europe” and the enthusiastic participation of “New Europe.” The “Pearl Harbor-style event” imagined by the neoconservatives—who hoped to make the 2000s the new American Century—had occurred. Now it was time to turn the Middle East and North Africa into America’s “third backyard” and, more importantly, to remake the world in the image of the United States.

By 2003, after two years of relentless shock and awe, Bush Jr.’s America seemed on the verge of eternalizing the Unipolar Moment. Mullah Omar’s Taliban had fled into the caves of the Hindu Kush; the score with Saddam Hussein had been settled; Muammar Gaddafi had renounced his ambition to acquire weapons of mass destruction; and the Arab sphere had rallied around the coalition of the willing. Osama bin Laden had become a ghost after the battle of Tora Bora—so much so that rumors spread that he was already dead.

The Project for a New American Century, drawn up by Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and the other neoconservatives who dominated Washington at the time, seemed to be taking shape—or at least that was the impression. Whether that was objective reality or mere illusion, it didn’t last long. According to the political analyst Alessandro Politi—a view I fully share—the advance of the Unipolar Moment stalled at Fallujah in 2004, during the first direct confrontation between U.S. forces and the newly formed Iraqi jihadist insurgency.

The troops of the coalition of the willing emerged victorious from the Battle of Fallujah, but without realizing that it would be the first in a long series of clashes destined to turn the (lightning) War on Terror into an endless war of attrition.
America had walked straight into the trap set by Bin Laden, who—according to the spy Omar Nasiri—had used his fighters, imprisoned in CIA black sites, to spread the fabricated Saddam–Al-Qaeda connection.
“Bin Laden wanted Bush to invade Iraq,” Nasiri wrote in Inside the Jihad, because that was essential to fulfilling his dream: to mire America in the Middle East and use the hatred sown by that act of neo-imperialism to raise entire generations in anti-Americanism.

Whether Nasiri exaggerated for the sake of selling his memoirs or told the truth remains open to debate. What seems clearer, at least to me, is that the ultimate winner of the Pyrrhic War on Terror—which cost Americans eight trillion dollars and Arabs over a million lives—was Bin Laden himself.
The war that was supposed to end all wars instead ended the never-born American Century.

Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by western security agencies. Throughout the 80s he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally “the database”, was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians.

Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary from 1997 to 2001

Political Islam is going through a second adolescence. The Muslim Brotherhood is expanding its influence across the European ummah, while Millennials and Zoomers in the Middle East and North Africa are undergoing a process of religious radicalization that runs sharply counter to the secular turn of their governments. Afghanistan, after twenty years of war against the Taliban, has been abandoned to the Taliban. Iraq has never recovered from its civil war and is teeming with both old and new terrorist factions, without ever truly entering the American orbit. And in Syria, it became necessary to legitimize Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham—a stepchild of Al-Qaeda—because a genuine democratic alternative to the Assads never materialized.

The ambition to retreat into an eternal splendid isolation, learning from the mistakes of the British ancestors who withdrew from history without foreseeing Germany’s rise, has crashed against reality.
The United States declared war on an invisible, deterritorialized enemy—terror itself—forgetting that ideas are bulletproof, and that they can only be defeated by other ideas: ideas that are stronger, more compelling, better, and just.

Now preoccupied with confronting the Russia–China axis—another challenge unforeseen due to a mix of hubris and post-historicism—the United States is underestimating Bin Laden’s specter, thinking, or perhaps hoping, it can apply realpolitik with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, post-Daesh movements, and the Taliban. But history, even recent history, suggests that certain forms of terrorism are neither controllable nor reliable—they are Frankenstein’s monsters.

The expectation of a calculated disengagement from the Arab sphere, meant to allow a pivot toward the Western Pacific, will be obstructed by the new springtime experienced by the many forms and mutations of political Islam. In ways different from the post-9/11 era, these movements will spread radicalization, chaos, and bloodshed across the world—fuel on the fire of the emerging Turkish–Israeli rivalry and the growing crisis of legitimacy of the remaining Arab monarchies and military dictatorships. Perhaps, the next bin Laden-like figure will be born in a Palestinian refugee camp. Overall, a global crisis with the Jerusalem question as its epicenter is coming.

Bin Laden has, without a doubt, won—perhaps because he had read Sun Tzu. Before launching the 1998 Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders from a cave in Central Asia, he had studied both his enemy and the terrain of battle.

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